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Performance is a central element in the delivery of health 
services, especially in public health, where resources seem 
to be always limited. Therefore, the design, implementation 
and evaluation of strategies to improve efficiency in public 
health is (or should be) a common practice. In dentistry 
the situation is no different. Furthermore, given our high 
morbidity indicators we must always improve efficiency 
in spending.
One of the strategies proposed to improve performan-
ce is precisely pay-for-performance (P4P). However, P4P 
does not simply imply paying a certain amount of money 
for achieving certain goals. A recent systematic review ad-
dresses the complex design that P4P programs involve and 
how variations in context or design can have an impact on 
results. The review concludes that there is no conclusive 
evidence regarding the implementation of P4P programs. 
It is also necessary that such programs be targeted to areas 
with low performance and be constantly evaluated. Fina-
lly, measurements and assessments should be consistent 
with the priorities of the system and adapted to changes 
in the context1.
A number of P4P programs have been implemented in 
Chilean public dentistry, but little research has been con-
ducted on their outcomes or results. Cornejo-Ovalle makes 
an assessment of the implementation of incentives for pro-
fessionals who provide dental care to 6-year-old children, 
beneficiaries by the Explicit Health Guarantees System 
(GES). These incentives were paid as a bonus per perfor-
mance according to the rate of dental discharge in this age 
group. The results are clearly positive, not only for impro-
ving discharge indicators, but also because their impact is 
greater in the lowest socioeconomic groups. Cornejo-Ova-
lle noted the need to further deepen and improve P4P stra-
tegies used in dentistry, adding new indicators and incenti-
ves. He places special emphasis on the inclusion of the rate 
of caries-free children within these indicators2.
EDITORIALI I L
Pay-for-performance? 
Let's take a look beyond the numbers in dentistry.
All this shows that P4P strategies are an option that 
should be considered in public health, but they need to 
be well designed, implemented and evaluated constantly. 
However, to implement them in Chilean public dentistry it 
is necessary to take into consideration other elements rela-
ted to professional and local idiosyncrasies. Neglecting tho-
se and other relevant considerations could lead to programs 
with misleading results.
First, there is evidence that dentists consider their econo-
mic interests when they diagnose and treat patients. That is 
precisely the reason why P4P can have an impact on perfor-
mance. However, the economic incentive may have an un-
desirable impact on the dentist’s clinical practice. Naegele 
et al.3 showed that there is a discrepancy between the diag-
nosis for dental treatment performed by salaried dentists 
and the treatment delivered by fee-for-service dentists. Pa-
tients who had less need of treatment (most of them) ended 
up receiving a longer and complex treatment. The opposite 
occurred in patients who were most in need of treatment. 
While it is possible to put forward several hypotheses for 
this discrepancy, it is very likely that economic incentives 
affect the clinical judgment of the dentist. In this case it 
is proposed that the fee-for-service dentists would provide 
more treatments than the necessary for  their patients, to 
make dental practice more profitable. This would apply to 
the group of patients with low need for treatment, but we 
must not forget that the group with high need for dental 
care received less than the required treatment. This is very 
relevant in our context, given our high rates of oral disease. 
It may be that a large group of patients would receive fewer 
procedures than necessary before discharge. Or it could be 
that the group of patients most in need of treatment end 
up being neglected because delivering their treatment and 
achieving their discharge demand more effort and resour-
ces. Delving further into this point, a P4P program could 
increase levels of inequality, providing care for people with 
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fewer needs and discouraging the attention of those really 
in need.
Second, a scheme based on economic incentives could 
reinforce an instrumental vision of patients. In other 
words, it could make dentists consider patients as means 
rather than as ends. In a very interesting research, Alcota 
et al.4 evaluated how the teaching of dentistry at a Chi-
lean university contributed to a commitment to ethics 
and public responsibility. The results of this research are 
worrying, since the teaching of dentistry did not promote 
these values. On the contrary, there was an individualis-
tic and dehumanized approach to patients. Given that the 
number of patients attending college clinics was limited, 
students had to compete for them. Then, patients were not 
seen as people with needs, but were reduced to a number 
of procedures necessary to meet certain requirements to 
pass clinical courses. If we extrapolate this to a P4P pro-
gram, it is not difficult to think that many times patients 
will be reduced to procedures or discharges necessary to 
get high economic incentives at the end of the year. This 
again would increase the search for patients with less need 
for treatment, involving a more efficient use of the dentist’s 
time to achieve his/her goal.
Third, we must consider the role of decisions made 
by patients about their own treatments. Although incen-
tives of P4P programs are in line with health priorities, 
these might not be consistent with the beliefs or needs of 
the population. This could make patients opt for servi-
ces or benefits that are "not necessary for them" and end 
up decreasing the desired efficiency5. In the case of local 
dentistry, patients may prefer to opt for simply cosmetic 
treatments instead of others that could help them reco-
ver their oral health integrally. Moreover, the imposition 
of "more efficient" treatments could end up disappoin-
ting the patients. This will happen especially in patients 
with fewer economic resources, as they have no other 
option but to make use of the oral health care delivered 
by public services.
It is clear that the design of P4P programs in dentistry 
should consider psychological and behavioral aspects of 
dentists and patients, it can never be simply reduced to 
numbers. As the same thing has happened with other 
interventions in dentistry, the greatest danger is to conti-
nue reinforcing the health paradox and not provide oral 
health to those who need it the most.
Finally, we must not forget that as the law of Campbell 
says "the more any quantitative social indicator (or even some 
qualitative indicator) is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is 
intended to monitor".
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